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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
RAYMOND J. WALDMANN*
The presentation discusses this Administration's policies to
stimulate global economic growth and development. Further dis-
cussion centers on how these policies are being integrated into our
trade relations with Latin America, the Caribbean Basin and
Mexico.
I. THE ADMINISTRATION'S OVERALL TRADE POLICY
The Reagan Administration recognizes the importance of an
open and equitable world trading system. The Administration is
basing its international economic policies on the principles of open
markets and free trade. The benefits of a free and open interna-
tional trading system were first identified for us in Adam Smith's
treatise on the Wealth of Nations.' It is unfortunate that hundreds
of years later, we have still not been able to achieve this goal. For
its part, the Reagan Administration is firmly committed to the re-
duction and ultimate elimination of the remaining barriers to trade.
If successful, as Adam Smith pointed out, all countries would
benefit.
Unfortunately, our task is not an easy one. The International
Trading System is currently facing one of the most serious threats
since the proliferation of "Beggar thy neighbor" policies in the
1930s. The concept of free and open markets is under extreme
pressure. Many countries now produce highly competitive prod-
ucts. In the market place, government concern about declining and
slowly improving rates of growth is more frequent. World patterns
of trade are changing. Developing countries have become competi-
tive in a wide range of manufactures and now challenge the indus-
trialized countries in domestic and foreign markets.
Economic difficulties have led to growing pressures around the
' A specialist on international economic affairs who served in a variety of senior posi-
tions during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, Assistant Secretary for International Eco-
nomic Policy, U.S. Department of Commerce.
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world to increase protectionism, 2 restrict imports in order to pre-
serve jobs and maintain declining industries. In some countries this
pressure has resulted in bilateral trade arrangements which either
limit or distort trade flows. We are witnessing an increased use of
investment regulations which require producers to meet local pro-
curement guidelines or commit themselves to certain levels of ex-
port. Some countries that benefit greatly from the open trading
system have failed to open their markets adequately and thereby
take unilateral advantage of the open trading countries.
This Administration is determined to resist protectionist pres-
sures. Open trade on the basis of mutually agreed upon rules is in
our best economic interest; it is in everyone's interest. It is the only
available path which promises efficient utilization and allocation of
resources on a global scale. It is the only sure course toward global
economic growth and progress.
We are pursuing policies aimed at the achievement of an open
trading system through the elimination of trade barriers and trade-
distorting policies. In seeking these fundamental objectives, we are
focusing on a number of policies. These are: (1) restoration of
healthy, non-inflationary domestic growth in industry, agriculture
and services; (2) improvement of international trade rules; (3) elim-
ination or reduction of export disincentives and better management
of government programs promoting United States exports; (4) pur-
suit of an effective approach to industrial adjustment problems;
and, (5) effective enforcement of United States trade laws and inter-
national trade agreements.
A healthy United States economy is essential in terms of re-
storing our competitive position in overseas markets. President
Reagan's Economic Recovery Program3 is designed to set the
United States economy back on the path of self-sustained, non-in-
flationary growth by increasing investment incentives and the avail-
ability of capital, removing needless government regulations and
fostering stable growth of the money supply. Recent trends in
United States productivity and investment have weakened our abil-
ity to compete abroad and have eroded our industrial base at home.
We are convinced, however, that the implementation of our recov-
2. For a discussion of growing protectionism, see Green, The New Protectionism, 3
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1981).
3. See Program for Economic Recovery, President Reagan's Address before Joint Ses-
sion of Congress, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 130 (Feb. 18, 1981); Program for Economic
Recovery, President Reagans Address to the Nation, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1024
(Sept. 24, 1981).
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ery plan will improve United States competitiveness at home and
abroad.
II. TRADE RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Within this broad trade-policy framework, relations with de-
veloping countries have been singled out by this Administration for
special consideration. The United States fully recognizes the im-
portance of these developing countries to both the United States
economy and to a strong world economy. An increasing portion of
United States exports of manufactured and agricultural products is
absorbed by developing countries. In 1970, 26 percent of United
States exports were marketed in developing countries.4 By 1980,
this figure had grown to 36 percent.5 This growing market for
United States goods is vital to our mutual economic welfare. The
developing countries' ability to import our products is dependent
upon market access for their goods and the availabililty of financ-
ing. In 1980, the value of United States imports from the develop-
ing countries was $113 million 6 which included 50 percent of their
total export of manufactures.
These statistics clearly illustrate that the United States is en-
deavoring to improve trade between itself and the developing coun-
tries. At the same time, the Administration is committed to helping
the countries of the Western Hemisphere keep this region politi-
cally stable. A number of countries are exposed to subversion of
great subtlety and sophistication by Cuba.
Throughout much of the postwar period, the countries of the
Western Hemisphere compiled an enviable economic record of sus-
tained growth which was accompanied by the emergence of strong
entrepreneurial classes. But in some of these countries success has
been lopsided in that it has been unaccompanied by broad opportu-
nities for participation in political decision-making. This has re-
sulted because of a lack of progress, both in controlling corruption
and providing more equitable distribution of income.
In addition, these countries have had internal enemies consist-
ing of small insurrectional groups, often of middle-class origin, who
are deeply divided over tactics. Old-line communists argue that no
revolution could occur before the objective conditions for it existed.
4. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
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Others believe that dramatic or daring acts such as kidnappings
and raids would radicalize the people. Typically, a gulf has sepa-
rated the unions and peasant organizations from the small groups
of violent insurgents. Cuba has taken advantage of these
circumstances.
Cuba is now attempting to establish Nicaragua as a forward
base of operations with a large army and intelligence apparatus al-
ready in place, supported by six to eight hundred Cuban military
advisors. Armored personnel carriers, tanks and jets are reported
to be in transit. Although at a lower rate than this winter, Cuba's
efforts to supply Nicaragua with arms, headquarters and guerrilas
from neighboring countries have continued.
In the Caribbean Islands, Cuba has hoped to destabilize fragile
governments beset by high unemployment and the double impact
of high petroleum and low commodity prices. In Jamaica, Cuba
relied heavily on radical groups who desired to turn the country
further to the left. But Cuba failed when the Jamaican people gave
Edward Seaga an unprecedented electoral victory in October,
1980.' Although Cuba has been more successful in tiny Grenada,
eight other islands have clearly rejected radical solutions through
the ballot box.
Our response to the Cuban challenge is clear. First, we will
help threatened countries defend themselves. There is no alterna-
tive once insurgents take arms with outside support. As we have
seen in El Salvador, great resources are not required; rather timing
and a demonstration of will are critical factors. Second, we will
help threatened countries to preserve their people's right to self-
determination. Political and social progress would include the in-
volvement of broader sections of the public in decision-making
through legitimate elections, the carrying out of appropriate land
reforms, or containment of violence from whatever quarter. This
approach must be accompanied by military assistance. Third, we
will focus on the source of the problem. Cuba has become a dis-
turbed society with a poverty level now lower than existed at the
time of the revolution. A fifth of its citizens may wish to emigrate.
Cuba is dependent on Soviet aid which consists of $8 million per
day. Yet it plays Gurkha to the Soviet imperialists in Africa and
threatens nearly all of its neighbors. Thore who said that Cuba
would, with time, become a status quo power must now recognize
7. Edward Philip George Seaga is the present Prime Minister of Jamaica.
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that they were wrong. In 1977, when the United States raised the
question of normalization, Cuba intervened in Ethiopia and then
launched an offensive in the hemisphere. Cuba has declared covert
war on its neighbors-our neighbors.
Ultimately, genuine stability can only be based on long term
economic prosperity. Growing global economic interdependence is
one of the most important international developments of the post-
war period. President Reagan, in speeches in Philadelphia' and at
Cancun,9 has emphasized that this growing interdependence re-
quires us to give fresh impetus to development by devising a new
strategy for growth. This strategy will be based upon the following
five fundamental principles: (1) stimulate international trade by
opening up markets, both within and among countries; (2) tailor
developmental programs to the specific needs and potentials of in-
dividual countries and regions; (3) target assistance programs to-
ward the development of self-sustaining productive capacities,
particularly in food and energy; (4) encourage developing countries
to improve their domestic climates for private investment, both in-
digenous and foreign; and, (5) work to create and support a stable
and democratic political environment in which tangible progress
towards solving the problems of development can be realized.
This action program to spur economic development in devel-
oping countries will consist of practical steps to implement these
principles. We will continue to build upon our past and impressive
record of contribution to developing countries. In the last ten
years, we have provided to developing countries $43 billion in de-
velopment assistance and $14 billion in contributions to multilat-
eral development institutions. In addition, our action program will
combine trade, investment and aid measures in a coordinated and
comprehensive approach to solving development problems. We
will systematically develop bilateral and regional programs to im-
plement the machinery needed to create conditions conducive to
development. This approach to economic development can per-
haps best be illustrated by reviewing the priority attention which is
being accorded to South America, the Caribbean Basin and
Mexico.
8. President Reagan's Remarks to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, 17
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1137 (Oct. 15, 1981).
9. President Reagan's statement at the First Plenary Session of the International Meet-
ing of Cooperation and Development in Cancun, Mexico, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRE. Doc.
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III. TRADE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AMERICA
A major goal for the Administration is to respond to the new
realities of South America: to the broad movement toward a return
to constitutional rule and democratic practice, to South America's
remarkable economic progress and still greater potential and to
South America's growing strategic importance.
The broad trend is unmistakably toward liberalization. Brazil's
impressive 4bertura'o is well advanced; rights violations are largely
a thing of the past and direct state and municipal elections are
scheduled for next year. After more than a decade of military dom-
ination, both Ecuador and Peru have returned to parliamentary
rule. In Argentina and Chile, violations of human rights have
sharply decreased. Moreover, the continued vigor of democratic
systems in Venezuela and Colombia is an important element of
strength.
In the 1970s, no continent grew more in economic terms than
South America. Brazil doubled its real output in less than ten
years," producing half of the continent's gross domestic product
(GDP) and becoming the world's tenth largest economy. Chile has
opened its economy to the stimulus of free competition which is
now booming. Meanwhile, Venezuela has turned a part of its vast
resources into an instrument of help for its less fortunate neighbors.
The potential for growth in this decade is no less impressive,
but the obstacles to be overcome will be at least as great as they
were in the 1970s. Some countries have high indebtedness resulting
from past investment and high prices for imported petroleum.
Other countries need markets for agricultural goods and a growing
volume of manufacturers.
Clearly the potential of this region cannot be fully realized un-
less the United States and the individual countries of South
America are able to achieve greater levels of cooperation in our
economic relations. The United States still absorbs a full quarter of
all the goods and commodities exported from South American
countries," who in turn depend on American sources for 28 percent
10. Abertura is a Portuguese term meaning a policy of political relaxation that permits
the emergence of a more broad ranged party spectrum in anticipation of state and congres-
sional elections in 1982. See POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1981 at 94 (A. Banks &
W. Overstreet ed. 1981).
11. See 3 No. 3-4 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF THE OAS 32, Table No. A-2 (July-Dec.
1981).
12. See 1979-1980 STATISTICAL Y.B. 502-10, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.S/7
(1981).
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of their imports of goods. In addition, the bulk of foreign bank
lending comes from the United States. Our mutual dependence is
so high that only the most careful joint management of our eco-
nomic affairs can assure success. This Administration is committed
to achieving such cooperation.
Finally, we must recognize the growing strategic importance of
the South Atlantic. The construction of supertankers and the
world's dependence on Persian Gulf oil have made the South At-
lantic the energy lifeline in the modem world. Forty-six percent of
our petroleum imports, sixty-six percent of West Europe's, and al-
most all of Brazil's are carried through or across the South Atlantic.
Protection of this commerce is of vital importance.
IV. TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
A second policy priority of this Administration is to help the
countries of the Caribbean Basin realize rapid economic develop-
ment and achieve political stability. The people of the Caribbean
Basin are our immediate neighbors. We are dependent on each
other both economically and politically. The security of this hemi-
sphere is directly threatened if the politics of Caribbean countries
become more unstable, if their economies fail, or if their citizens
believe that unauthorized entry to the United States offers the only
escape from a future of political violence and abject poverty.
The United States response to this challenge is clear. First, we
must continue to work closely with other interested countries, espe-
cially Venezuela, Mexico and Canada, in order to foster develop-
ment in the Caribbean region. These countries also have a direct
stake in the future of the Caribbean Basin nations and are already
contributing significant amounts of official assistance. Second, we
can only succeed if the countries of the Caribbean Basin are fully
engaged in the planning and implementing of the development pro-
gram. Most developing countries now acknowledge that the major
impetus to development must come from domestic forces. Third,
one of our main objectives is to help Caribbean Basin countries to
create a new and competitive production capacity and to take better
advantage of existing human and capital resources. Trade, aid and
investment measures must be coordinated into a comprehensive
package designed to stimulate orderly and effective growth. The
program's successfulness will also be dependent on engaging the
vitality and energy of the private sector, and not relying exclusively
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develop an environment conducive to both foreign and domestic
investment.
In addition to stimulating supply to spur development, it is
recognized that action on the demand side is also needed. The
United States has a potentially large role here. We currently im-
port nearly three-fifths of the area's exports, with 87 percent of the
exports entering duty-free. Because the economies of Caribbean
countries are small, greater access to the United States market
could have a major impact on their economic future. Because they
are so small, increased access for these countries need not, and with
appropriately designed safeguards will not, disrupt United States
markets. Therefore, we are examining the possibility of expanding
access into the United States market for Caribbean products. This
policy is consistent with the open trading policy of the Administra-
tion and its commitment to assist developing countries.
Finally, a coherent plan cannot be established without increas-
ing the official assistance now granted to the area. Additional
assistance can come from the international financial institutions,
but it must also come from the United States. Despite severe
budget constraints, we are thus seeking an increase in our bilateral
programs. Moreover, while the overall action concept must be
multilateral, it is believed that the actual implementation should be
bilateral. Potential participants are too heterogeneous for us to
forge a simple multilateral blueprint that is appropriate for all. We
must cooperate, coordinate, and be mutually supportive without
expecting automatic consensus or conformity.
V. TRADE RELATIONS WITH MEXICO
Our aim concerning Mexico is to develop a relationship of co-
operation and mutual sensitivity which recognizes Mexico's impor-
tant role in our affairs and in those of the world. Mexico is now our
third largest trading partner, and will likely become second by the
end of this decade. As early as 1985, bilateral trade with Mexico
could reach a value of $80 billion. Notwithstanding this recent
trade boom, the history of United States-Mexican trade relations
shows that for too many years, the United States neglected its com-
mercial ties with Mexico; the reason is not hard to find. Including
even the recent growth in our bilateral trade, United States trade
with Mexico in 1980 accounted for only 6 percent of United States
global trade. Mexican trade with the United States, however, ac-
counted for two-thirds of Mexico's global trade. This explains in
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part why the United States has tended to focus on multilateral is-
sues while Mexico has focused on the bilateral side.
We can no longer afford to assign secondary importance to our
relations with Mexico. It is for this reason that President Reagan
looked first to the establishment of a relationship of equality, har-
mony and trust between our two nations. At Camp David in June
1981, Presidents Reagan and Lopez-Portillo recognized that a con-
tinuing boom in trade between the United States and Mexico will
bring greater economic development to Mexico and new export op-
portunities to United States businesses. But the leaders also fore-
saw potential problem areas as our entire spectrum of relations
continues to expand. In order to resolve these problems before they
undermine the broader United States-Mexican commercial rela-
tionship, the two Presidents decided to create a Joint Commission
on Commerce and Trade.
This Commission was established in Washington in the last
week of June, 1981. On the United States side, the Commission is
chaired by Secretary of Commerce Baldrige and United States
Trade Representative Brock; on the Mexican side by Secretary of
Commerce de la Vega. One of the unique aspects of the Joint
Commission is its mandate to provide the private sector access to
the decision-making process. Close cooperation with the United
States business community is an important aspect of the success of
the Commission's work, and is consistent with President Reagan's
philosophy of relying on market forces to direct our commercial
relations with our trading partners. One other point that is most
important to understanding the purpose of the Joint Commission is
that it was not designed to be simply a forum for discussion. The
two Presidents expect that the Commission has a broad mandate to
improve and promote the trade and commercial relationship be-
tween the United States and Mexico.
The work program resulting from the inaugural session of the
Joint Commission spells out an ambitious agenda for the future.
Some of the issues we will continue to bring to the attention of
Mexican officials in the course of our continuing consultations in-
clude performance requirements, import licensing restrictions,
Mexican incentive programs, and customs and visa regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has outlined the broad principles
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economic development issues. There will be future announcements
of specific proposals to deal with pressing development needs in
this region. We will continue to build on our record of past contri-
bution to development and will devise bilateral and regional initia-
tives to contribute to the process of generating sustained growth.
We will encourage developing countries to diversify exports; we
will target our assistance to those most in need; we will seek to in-
corporate all developing countries more fully into the GATT sys-
tem. 1 3 Let me conclude by stressing that this Administration
believes it is essential to our own prosperity that all prosper. We
will seek to assure maximum opportunity for economic develop-
ment for those countries which are ready to join us in this effort.
13. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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